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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to build a general, foundational theory of medical law.
For reasons explained herein, the central conceptual tool in this theory will be a type of
contract that generates obligations binding both doctors and patients. This is in response to
a call for a study that seeks to propose a legal theory of medical malpractice, which may
possibly combine the theory of the duty of care and the theory of the construction of terms
of contract.
1)
Such a study has been urged to be made following the rejection, by the
Supreme Court of Japan, of a proposition that the obligations of doctors include, unless
otherwise stipulated in express terms of contract, “a duty to exert utmost endeavour to
provide patients with medical service as thorough, serious and faithful as possible (which is
an example of contractual ‘obligation of meansʼ as opposed to that of result) irrespective of
the standard of medical care and skill”.
2)
The Supreme Court rejected an attempt at over-
coming problems which are not quite unlike those surrounding the Bolam test by “a re-
sponsible body of professional opinion” in English law.
3)
The theoretical basis of the Japa-
1) SHIOMI Yoshio, Keiyaku Sekinin no Taikei (System of Contractual Liabilities) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku)
2000, pp. 209-210. cf. For similarity between the courtʼs imposition of the duty of care and the ﬁnding
of an implied term, see Lord Hoffmann in South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Mon-
tagu [1997] AC 191 at 212.
2) The Supreme Court, Judgment of 8 June 1996, [1996] 1450 Hanrei Jiho 70, 812 Hanrei Times 177.
3) Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committe [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587.
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nese court ruling has been criticised to be far removed from the theory of contract,
allegedly due to the futility, so far, of discussions concerning the basic theoretical frame-
work of medical law.
4)
Having said that, this study does not end up proposing a theory within the ﬁeld of the
doctorʼs contractual liabilities. It is intended to be a theory with applicability to service
contracts in general, which generate obligations of means. Many aspects of this theory
may, after some minor modiﬁcations, be adapted to contracts guaranteeing speciﬁc results
(obligation of result) as well as to delict/tort. Following on from this, in a kind of domino
effect, the theory may develop into a general theory of the laws of obligations.
2. Contract is a better conceptual tool than delict/tort for the law to
employ where it is involved in the relationship between doctors and
patients
A . Underlying Thoughts
The key concepts in this paper are: contract as collaboratory concept vs. delict/tort as
accusatory concept.
The law of contract helps parties in achieving a common purpose towards which they
have agreed with one another. By making contract, parties have created between them a
legal relationship in which they are committed themselves to the realisation of the agreed
purpose. Such a legal relationship is called die Willensgemeinschaft, or “community of the
wills”. Put in English terms, doctors and patients are “partners” working together towards
achieving their agreed upon purpose of curing or alleviating the patientʼs disease or injury.
Therefore, in the event of a failure to achieve the purpose, a redress should ﬁrstly be
sought within the framework of contract law. It is inappropriate to dissolve their partner-
ship where a medical accident takes place, and to treat the doctor as a wrong-doer and the
patient as a victim in an attempt to resolve the case within the framework of delict/tort
law. In fact, doctors are highly embarrassed, offended or even frightened to be sued and
branded as wrong-doers, delinquents and tortfeasors.
It is the present authorʼs point of view that a shift in emphasis is warranted from the
protection of the patientʼs right to that of medical care contract. In order to ensure the
fulﬁllment of the objectives of medical care contracts, it is necessary to improve medical
care environment in which medical care contracts are performed (e.g. provision of better
system and place of work, better equipment and staff for medical professionals; and fair
access to medical institutions and resources).
This approach, which employs the conceptual tool of contract, seems to be optimal in
serving both the patients and the medical personnel involved. Today, it is no longer
enough for us to cry out for the protection of patients on the assumption that the latter are
4) SHIOMI, op. cit.
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always the weaker and aggrieved parties in a situation where something goes medically
wrong.
B . Why is contract preferable to delict/tort?
In contrast to tort law, which seeks a solution from the point of view of the aftermath
of the tort, contract law encourages doctors and patients to agree in advance on those rules
that will cause both parties to feel secure and satisﬁed.
Tort law scholars do not conceive their subject to be backward-looking; from their
point of view, tort law gives only an ex posto facto decision case by case, where the
accumulation of such decisions will eventually develop into a coherent set of standing
rules.
However, this argument may be acceptable only among jurists (in particular those who
are specialised in the studies of tort). It is unreasonable to expect that doctors will check
all the volumes of judicial precedents in order to comply with them. Furthermore, as
judicial precedents provide more than one rule, it is difﬁcult even for jurists to sort through
the complexities so as to identify which rule ought to be applied in which set of circum-
stances.
By contrast, if there is a set of rules, which clearly state, “you should comply with the
terms of your contract before you act; if you breach one, you will be held legally responsi-
ble; as long as you comply with them, you will basically have no liability”, then for doc-
tors, such a set of rules are far more comfortable and are easier to heed to.
By agreeing on a set of rules in advance, parties can build their relationship independ-
ently, which may develop into a relationship of trust and conﬁdence between them. This
may lead to creating a relationship of trust and conﬁdence not only between individual
doctors and patients but also between the doctor and the patient generally, and help dis-
perse their mutual distrust. Where disputes arising between the parties give rise to actions
in tort or criminal prosecutions, these can only leave both parties intensifying their distrust
of one another.
If their relationship is based on a contract, even if it may be unrealistic to have all
possible conjectures in their contemplation in advance, doctors and patients can make addi-
tions or modiﬁcations to their terms as they go along with the agreed therapeutic process,
and they can ﬁnd the best choice at each stage in the process, while sharing information
between themselves.
It is not intended to recommend that parties produce a thick bundle of contract docu-
ments. What matters here is the partiesʼ mutual mindset, not legal technique.
Doctors are greatly displeased with the current situation where they are required to be
tried under rules created ex posto facto by perfect strangers (namely judges, who are lay
persons in medicine). If contract is employed, they would not ﬁnd any reason to complain
where they are to be tried by the terms to whcih they have committed themselves.
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C. Metaphor of Archipelago of Contracts
There are four sources/causes of obligations in civil law, namely, contracts, delict/tort,
unjustified enrichment and gestion d’affaires. A hierarchical division of labour among
them may be illustrated by a metaphor of the archipelago of contracts (see appendix 1).
Suppose that people are “ﬂoating on the sea” of no manifestation of intention, where
the rules of gestion d'affaires (gestio negotiorum) apply to a good Samaritan who has
intervened to look after anotherʼs affairs or business without his request to do so,
5)
while
the rules of delict/tort apply to a person who has wronged another. In the provision of
medical care in the absence of contract, the rules of gestion d'affaires apply, where an
unsolicited medical intervention succeeds, while the rules of tort apply where such an inter-
vention fails, and has caused death or injury to the other person.
Where the manifestation of intentions of two or more people ﬂoating on this sea have
come to an agreement, the agreement generates an “island” of contract where the rules of
contract apply. There are a variety of such islands of contract, which comprise an archipe-
lago. Where the subject matter of contract is the provision of medical care, there is an
island in the form of the medical care contract.
Parties who escape the application of the rules of contracts, tort and gestion d'affaires,
sink to the seabed, from where they may be salvaged by the rules of unjustiﬁed enrichment
(to be distinguished from the equitable rules of “unjust enrichment” or “restitution” in
Anglo-American law, which are designed to make the defendant disgorge any unjustly
obtained gain). Unjustiﬁed enrichment is the English translation of the German ungerecht-
fertigte Bereicherung, and refers to “enrichment without cause” (after enrichissment sans
cause in French), which ought to be returned. It is not ordinarily expected that the rules of
unjustified enrichment are applicable to the provision of medical care.
Where no just and fair disposal of a case is possible by the application of these rules,
there may be blessings from the heaven, in other words, clouds of angels may provide
parties with salvation by employing the General Part (Allgemeiner Teil) concepts of good
faith, public order and against abuse of right (these are not quite unlike equity, e.g. con-
structive trusts, although particular contexts in which such concepts are employed in civil
law differ from the rules of equity). Thus, the rules of contract may still apply in special
circumstances where, strictly speaking, there is no solid island of contract,
6)
for example,
where a party is responsible for creating a mirage of a contract island, and for misleading
another to believe honestly that there is such an island, changing his position in reliance on
it, die Rechtsscheintheorie, that is, the “theory of legally protected appearance of contract”
5) English law neither helps an “ofﬁcious” intervention nor recognises such a source of obligations. See
Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. But the best interest rule in equity is ultimately traceable to the
rules of gestion d'affaires.
6) See the concurrent opinion of Justice CHIBA Katsumi of the Supreme Court, Judgment of 22 April
2011, 64-3 Minshu 1405, for the frontier between contract and tort.
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provides the misled party with such an island of contract (“constructive contract”); and
where a party has almost made a contract with another, but not yet fully done so, the court
may still ﬁnd culpa in contrahendo (“fault in the process of making contract”). Occasion-
ally, the legislature assumes the power of angels to make statutory interventions so as to
modify the rules of contract in the Civil Code, for example, by the enactment of the Con-
sumer Contract Act.
Where statutes provide special tortuous liabilities, such as in the case of the Product
Liability Act, Fire Liability Act and Automobile Liability Assurance Act, these comprise
jetties in a harbour of an island of contract, where the rules of contract and of tort concur-
rently apply.
From above, there is the “Sun” of human rights in Constitution, which illuminates the
archipelago. All civil law rules are to be interpreted in the light of human rights, so as to
give effect to these rights as far as it is reasonable to do so (i.e. the indirect application of
human rights in the sphere of private law).
Such a metaphor of the archipelago of contracts is intended to help illustrate the hier-
archical division of labour among the causes of obligations in their application.
Where a dispute gives rise to an action, in other words, to legal proceedings, angels
are set in motion over the archipelago, but the hierarchy among the causes of obligations
does not disappear. Even where legal proceedings have started, the distinctions and hierar-
chy among the causes of obligations under substantive law do not suddenly disappear once
and for all. This is because substantive law is primary, while procedural law is secondary.
The existence or not of rights and duties of obligations under substantive law is tested and
determined through proceedings in accordance with the rules of substantive law. Actions
may activate the angel of good faith, whose operation may create an island of “contract in
action”, i.e. a contract ex posto facto imposed by the court (“constructive contract”).
Therefore, the old doctrine of “subject-matter of action” (Streitsgegenstand), whereby the
rules of substantive law apply to proceedings, seems to be appropriate for the coherent
understanding of the relationship between substantive obligations and procedural actions.
It follows that because the hierarchy among the causes of obligations under substantive law
should be applied in legal proceedings, actions should be ranked and distinguished accord-
ingly between the principal action and accessories/alternatives.
D. Historical Development of Academic Theories on the Concurrence of Actions
7)
ⅰ Theory of Concurrence of Actions (adopted by court)
See appendix 2
As long as a single matter, or a factual situation, falls within the descriptions of two or
7) The association between the respective theories and the doctrines of subject-matter of action is not
deﬁnitively established. cf. OHMURA Atsushi, Kihon Minpo II (Basic Civil Law II) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku)
2003, p. 327.
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more sources/causes of obligations under the Civil Code, each cause of obligations founds a
corresponding action,
8)
for example, one action asserting contractual obligations, and another
tortuous obligations.
9)
Courts are said to have consistently been taking a stance of adopting
this theory of concurrence of actions under the old doctrine of subject-matter of actions.
10)
ⅱ Theory of Conﬂict of Civil Code Provisions
This theory sees a conﬂict of causes of obligations under Part III, Civil Code, behind
the conﬂict of actions. In this theory, contractual obligations take precedence over tortuous
obligations because of the Germanic interpretation of the structure of the Civil Code.
Since advocated by Kawashima in 1934, this theory had been dominant until the 1970s
among civil code theorists and civil procedure theorists.
11)
ⅲ Theory of Double “Sounds” of A Single Action
Along with the subsequent development, in the ﬁeld of civil procedure law, of the
new doctrine of the subject-matter of action by Mikazuki,
12)
a new theory has emerged,
8) cf. “... when, since 1873, the name of a form of action is used to identify a cause of action, it is used
as a convenient and succinct description of a particular category of factual situation which entitles one
person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.” per Diplock LJ in Letang v Cooper
[1965] 1 QB 232, at 243. Following the abolishment of the forms of action, the common law causes of
action have become closer to sources of obligations but not fully.
9) cf. Lord Goff of Chiveley in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 agrees at p. 191
with Oliver J in Midland Bank Trust v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1970] Ch. 384, who said at p. 522, “...
where concurrent liability in tort and contract exists the plaintiff has the right to assert the cause of
action that appears to be the most advantageous to him in respect of any particular legal consequence”.
10) cf. SHINDO Koji, Shin Minji Sosho Ho (New Civil Procedure Law) 5th ed. (Tokyo: Kobundo) 2011,
p. 311.
11) KAWASHIMA Takeyoshi, Minpo Kaishaku Gaku no Shomondai (Problems of Interpretation of Civil
Code) (Tokyo: Kobundo) 1949, pp. 1-155.
12) MIKAZUKI Akira, Minji Sosho Ho (Civil Procedure Act) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku) 1959, p. 101.
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Theory of Conflict of Civil Code Provisions
(New Doctrine of Subject-Matter of Action)
Theory of Hierarchical Concurrence of Actions
(Old Doctrine of Subject-Matter of Action) (advocated by Hirano)
Theory of Concurrence of Actions 
(Old Doctrine of Subject-Matter of Action) (adopted by court)
Theory of Double “Sounds” of A Single Action
(New Doctrine of Subject-Matter of Action)
Great Unified Theory of the Four Sources of Obligations
(New Doctrine of Subject-Matter of Action)
Dead end
where a single factual situation may appear to be the subject-matter of two or more ac-
tions, but where there is only one single action in substance (Okuda
13)
). Put in English
terms, they say that there is only a single action “sounded” in both contract and tort.
14)
ⅳ Great Uniﬁed Theory of the Causes of Obligations
Thereafter, a “great uniﬁed theory” of the four causes of obligations has been ad-
vanced by Shinomiya.
15)
Due to practical difﬁculties unifying the causes of obligations,
studies have reached a dead end and cannot go any further on this theory.
ⅴ Where We Are Now
“The issue of concurrence of actions is still in chaos” (Kato
16)
).
“None of the theories advanced thus far has gained sufﬁciently wide support in the
scientiﬁc community. The situation is chaotic.” (Hirai
17)
).
E . Hiranoʼs Point of View (A Theory of Hierarchical Concurrence of Actions)
The basis on which the theory of conﬂict of Civil Code provisions stands, i.e. that
contract law prevails over tort law, is correct (see the metaphor of the archipelago of
contracts).
However, giving priority to contract may lead to substantial problems, such as imbal-
ance of power between the parties, which needs to be rectiﬁed. This point can account for
why the theory of conﬂict of the Civil Code provisions lost support in the period of rapid
economic growth when corporate activities boomed in Japan (1960-1980): where, if an
action sounded in contract is the only available means for seeking relief, contracts would,
for example, be made in standard terms prejudicial to consumers, who are in a position of
relative weakness. Thus, an action sounded in tort should be concurrently allowed as an
alternative action with which to give relief to aggrieved parties.
Subsequently, there has been a signiﬁcant development in the legal community aiming
to address issues of inequality between contractual parties by employing the General Part
concepts of public order, good faith and against abuse of right. To date, substantial prob-
lems associated with the prioritisation of contract have been resolved outside the sphere of
the Civil Code, as a result of a series of enactment of special statutes, designed to protect
the weak and aggrieved parties, for example, the Land and Building Leases Act, the Inter-
13) OKUDA Masamichi, “Seikyuken to Soshobutsu” (Action/Claim and Subject-Matter of Action) (1) and
(2), (1968) 213 Hanrei Times, pp. 4-14; and (1968) 214 Hanrei Times, pp. 2-17.
14) cf. Diplock LJ said in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at 244 “... that factual situation may fall
within the description of the tort of trespass to the person (and that of the tort of negligence). It does not
mean that there are two causes of action. It merely means that there are two apt descriptions of the same
cause of action."
15) SHINOMIYA Kazuo, Seikyuken Kyogo Ron (Concurrence of Actions) (Tokyo: Ichiryusha) 1978.
16) KATO Masanobu, “Seikyuken Kyogo Ron” (Concurrence of Actions) in Minpo Gakusetsu 100-nenshi
(History of A Hundred Years of Academic Opinions on Civil Law) (Tokyo: Sanseido) 1999, p. 353.
17) HIRAI Yoshio, Saiken Kakuron I, Keiyaku Soron (Particulars of Obligations I, General Rules of Con-
tracts) (Tokyo: Kobundo) 2008, p. 15.
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est Rate Restriction Act, the Consumer Contract Act, the Labour Contract Act, the Auto-
mobile Liability Assurance Act, and the Product Liability Act.
18)
Today, the background
circumstances have greatly changed since the 1970s, when the theory of conﬂict of Civil
Code provisions was rejected.
In the context of the Civil Code, it is consistent to give priority to contract in accord-
ance with the theory of conﬂict of Civil Code provisions, i.e. that of the causes of obliga-
tions.
It should be noted, however, that the theory of conﬂict of the causes of obligations
cannot provide a logical reason for the view that a medical malpractice cannot found an
action on tort, even though it satisﬁes the constituting elements of the tort under the Civil
Code. Such illogical denial of an action contravenes Article 76 (3) of the Constitution,
which authorises the court to try and decide a case only in accordance with law. It also
infringes the plaintiffʼs right to access to court, which is guaranteed under Article 32 of the
Constitution. Taking all these points into consideration, it ought to be said that a single
matter of medical malpractice founds two actions, one on contract and the other on tort,
respectively, under substantive law.
With reference to the metaphor of the archipelago of contracts, which illustrates the hier-
archical structure in the application of the causes of obligations of the Civil Code, the most
logical explanation seems to be that a single medical malpractice founds both actions on con-
tract (for non-performance of obligation) and on tort, of which the former is prior to the latter.
In terms of the joinder of actions, where the plaintiff “sounds” his actions both in
contract and in tort on the same matter concurrently, he has, so far, been free to choose the
priority of pursuit between the two (selective joinder of actions). However, an action
sounded in contract should always be the principal action, while that in tort should be an
alternative action (prioritised joinder of actions).
The most straightforward interpretation in accordance with the structures of the Civil
Code and the Civil Procedure Code would arrive at this conclusion.
3. Period of Interest
In Japan, where actions on the same matter may be concurrently sounded in contract
and in tort, a major reason why the plaintiffʼs counsel tries to employ tort as far as it is
possible to do so, unless the action is time-barred, is that in tort, interest on damages runs
from the day of the accident in question, whereas in contract, interest on debt/damages
18) Imbalance between the parties under medical care contracts should, in principle, be re-balanced by
legislative interventions, by enacting special statute to be called, “Medical Contract Act”, or something
similar; or by inserting a new chapter of “medical care contract” in the Civil Code. Until this is done,
however, there is no choice but to pursue a solution through the construction of the relevant provisions
of the Civil Code and the Consumer Contract Act.
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runs from the day when the action/claim for damages for non-performance is brought to
court.
A. Judicial Precedents and Prevailing Academic Opinion
Secondary obligations to pay damages both in tort and in contract (for non-
performance of primary obligations) are categorised as statutory obligations.
A statutory obligation comes into existence by the operation of law, but the question
of whether or not and when to exercise it is left to the obligee. Therefore, where there is
no speciﬁed date of performance, the obligor is not liable for delay in performance until
the obligee demands/claims performance (article 412 (3) Civil Code). Then, according to a
plain construction of this clause, the liability for late performance of an obligation of
whichever source/cause, whether primary or secondary, should arise at the time when a
demand/claim/action for payment is made (in Japanese language, there is little distinction
between a legal action, claim, demand and invoice for payment).
Under the authority of a couple of pre-war rulings,
19)
however, the courts consistently
adherered to a view that both of the secondary obligations in contract and tort would
become payable at the time of the occurrence of damage. A prevailing academic opinion
supports this view, mainly due to fairness and history (e.g. Wagatsuma
20)
).
By contrast, the current case law dictates that where an action is sounded in contract,
damages for late performance runs only from when the action/claim is brought (The Su-
preme Court (until 1947), United Divisions, Judgment of 27 May, 1921,
21)
which is fol-
lowed by the current Supreme Court, Judgment of 18 December, 1980).
22)
B . Hiranoʼs Point of View (A Theory Distinguishing between an Intentional Tort
and a Non-intentional Tort)
It is not justiﬁed to treat a party who is liable for tort more unfairly than obligors of
the other types of the Civil Code obligations, simply because s/he is a tortfeasor.
Not all tort victims claim damages, and what is more, a tortfeasor cannot even know
whether or not a tort victim will exercise his/her right to claim damages until s/he is
notiﬁed of the victimʼs intention to claim. Therefore, it is not deleterious to the tort victim
to calculate interest on damages from the time of such a notice.
It is true that in a medical malpractice case, the fact that the patient suffers harm does
not immediately become obvious, so it is unavoidable that the patient makes a claim for
19) The Supreme Court (until 1947), Judgment of 20 October 1910 (16 Minroku 719) and Judgment of 13
February 1911 (17 Minroku 49).
20) WAGATSUMA Sakae, Shintei Saiken Soron (General Rules of Obligations, New Edition) (Tokyo:
Iwanami) 1964, p. 105.
21) 27 Minroku 963.
22) 34-7 Minshu 888.
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damages after a certain period of time has elapsed since the occurrence of harm. Never-
theless, this is no justiﬁcation for making the tortfeasor (the defendant) liable to pay inter-
est on damages for a period between the occurrence of the harm and the commencement of
action in court. It would be reasonable that where a victim, suspecting of a medical error,
ﬁrst demands an explanation from the doctor, the victim is deemed to have made a claim
for damages at that point in time implicitly and conditionally (on condition that a medical
error has taken place), with interest on damages running from this point onward.
Doctors will not accept the period of interest if they are held liable for delay from
before the point in time at which they know that they have committed any medical error,
or before they hear any complaint from patients or, as the case may be, from their be-
reaved family members.
Fur semper in mora est (“a thief is always in delay”) is a maxim which applies to an
intentional tort.
Consequently, it should be construed that interest on damages for an intentional tort
runs from the date of the commission of the tort. This construction is also fair because it
imposes on an intentional tortfeasor a heavier liability than it does on a negligent tortfea-
sor. On the other hand, in the case of a negligent tort, the usual rule for a statutory
obligation should apply, that is that interest on damages runs from the day after the day
when an action/claim for damages in tort is brought, as in the case of a person (the plain-
tiff) who has enriched another without legal reason.
For legislative purposes, relevant provisions may be drafted along the following lines:
“interest on debt or damages for a defective performance of an obligation shall run from
the day of the failure in performance"; “interest on damages for an intentional tort shall
run from the day when the tort is committed"; and “interest on damages for a negligent
tort shall run from the day after the day when an action in tort is brought”.
23)
4. Allocation of the Burden of Proof with regard to Non-Performance
Since an obligation to provide medical care is an obligation of means, a defective
performance of this type of obligation and the obligorʼs imputability (Zurechnungsgrunde)
are inseparable, and cannot be distinguished from each other. Accordingly, the obligee
must allege and prove the obligorʼs imputability even in contract as would be the case in
tort. Thus, there is no substantial difference between contract and tort in this respect. This
has been a common view in the academic community so far.
24)
In the pages below, the
23) The period of interest varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, it is prescribed by
law from a policy-oriented perspective. In Japan, it is determined through the construction of the Civil
Code.
24) SUZUKI Rokuya, Saiken Ho Kogi (Lectures on the Law of Obligations) 2nd ed., (Tokyo: Sobunsha)
1992, p. 606.
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validity of this view will be examined (see appendix 3, chart 1).
A. Factual Non-Performance
The concept of non-performance should be divided into two different concepts of
factual non-performance and the absence of excuse from imputation.
25)
In other words,
non-performance in the eyes of law is obtained by subtraction of excuse from factual non-
performance.
In a medical malpractice case, factual non-performance refers to a deviation from the
standard of medical care or from the terms of medical care contract. The plaintiff bears
the burden to allege, and to prove the deviation from the standard of care or from the
terms of contract.
26)
 For details of the concept of deviation from the standard of care, see appendix 11:
diagram of marginal cost curve and the doctorʼs breach of the duty of care.
 For details of the speciﬁc process of decision-making on factual non-performance, see
appendices 8 and 9: ﬂowcharts of the process of decision-making on the doctorʼs
breach of the duty of care in the light of the standard of care).
B . Excuses
ⅰ Prevailing Opinion
The view was once held that, in an action founded on contract, the obligor bears the
burden of proof as regards any lack of imputability (“impossibility”) (Kobe District Court,
Tastuno Branch, Judgment of 25 January 1967). Subsequently, Nakano has advocated that
in the case of an obligation of means, if the obligorʼs non-performance (in this category,
imperfect performance) is objectively established, his/her subjective imputability is also
established, such that s/he cannot argue any lack of imputability as defence.
27)
This opinion
has since gained wide support and has become an established and prevailing theory.
28)
ⅱ Hirano’s Point of View (Excuse as a Defence)
Even though an obligation to provide medical service is an obligation of means, if the
doctor is unable to provide medical service in a manner which satisﬁes the standard of care
and skill due to circumstances beyond his control, the doctor should be allowed to aver an
25) NAKATA Hiroyasu, Saiken Soron (General Rules of Obligations) New ed., (Tokyo: Iwanami) 2011,
p. 133.
26) The Supreme Court, Judgment of 9 June 1995 (49-6 Minshu 1499), Case of Retinopathy of Prematuri-
ty at Japanese Red Cross Society Himeji Hospital.
27) NAKANO Teiichiro, Shinryo Saimu-no Fukanzenriko to Shomei Sekinin (Imperfect Performance of
Medical Care Obligations and Burden of Proof) in Gendai Songaibaisho Ho Koza (Lectures on Modern
Law of Damages, Vol. 4) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha) 1974, p. 71.
28) MORITA Hiroki, “Kekka Saimu/Shudan Siamu no Kubetsu no Igi nituite” (On the Signiﬁcance of
Distinction between Obligation of Result and Obligation of Means) in Suzuki Rokuya Sensei Koki Kinen
(Festschrift for Suzuki Rokuya's Seventieth Birthday) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku) 1993, p. 109.
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excuse from imputation as a defence.
The prevailing opinion is that as far as an obligation of result is concerned, factual
non-performance (non-attainment of the guaranteed result) and the obligorʼs imputability
(absence of any excuse) are separate questions of fact (the present author has no objection
to this).
Also, according to the prevailing opinion, in the case of an obligation of means, any
ﬁnding of non-performance of the purpose of an obligation (“imperfect performance”)
should be made through the following process:
[1] deﬁne the scope of an obligation;
[2] identify the obligorʼs actual conduct; and
[3] determine how far the conduct has fulﬁlled the deﬁned obligation.
29)
When this process is applied to a medical care contract, the process runs in the fol-
lowing order:
[1] deﬁne the standard of medical care;
[2] identify the obligorʼs actual medical conduct; and
[3] determine how far the conduct has satisﬁed the standard of care.
What matters here is to what extent case-speciﬁc circumstances are taken into account
at the ﬁrst step of deﬁning the scope of an obligation or the standard of care. The estab-
lished judicial precedent admits that the standard of medical care is not uniform nation-
wide, while describing this concept in the following terms with some degree of abstraction
as being that “standard of medical care with which a doctor in a certain department of a
certain size of medical institution in a certain region is expected to comply”.
30)
Take the example of a cardiovascular physician working on duty at an accident and
emergency department of a local public hospital at night, with only three-year experience
in medical practice. He has had no sleep in the past twenty-four hours, and is required to
attend to a couple of patients brought to the hospital simultaneously by ambulances, one of
them having sustained rupture of internal organs in a tragic road trafﬁc accident, and the
other being an infant who has lost consciousness after a sudden seizure. While an experi-
enced doctor is also on duty that night, he is too busy at attending to a difﬁcult delivery.
The hospitalʼs medical equipment is out of date, and the hospital has been suffering from
communication blackout caused by an approaching typhoon. Such peculiar circumstances
surrounding the young doctor, although not uncommon, are not taken into account in the
deﬁnition of the standard of medical care and skill.
Among such case-speciﬁc circumstances, might that which is beyond the given doc-
torʼs or medical institutionʼs control be treated as impossibility, and thus as an excuse from
29) OHMURA Atsushi, Kihon Minpo III (Basic Civil Law III) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku) 2005, p. 106.
30) The Supreme Court, Judgment of 9 June 1995, 49-6 Minshu 1499, Case of Retinopathy of Prematurity
at Himeji Red Cross Hospital. cf. The Bolam test “by a responsible body of professional opinion”.
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587.
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imputation from non-performance of an obligation of means, just as in the case of an
obligation of result?
Of course, if such particularised standard of care as that of a doctor attending a num-
ber of emergency patients at night etc. is adopted in the ﬁrst step of the deﬁning the
standard of care, the-third-step determination as to how far that doctorʼs actual conduct has
satisﬁed the standard, would have almost automatically been achieved at the ﬁrst step, and
no issue of excuse would arise. However, it is beyond the patientʼs ability to allege and
prove such speciﬁc circumstances surrounding his/her doctor.
Therefore, the plaintiff (the patient) should be deemed to have sufﬁciently discharged
his burden of proof as regards the defendantʼs imperfect performance by the averment and
proof of the standard of care in abstract terms, and of the defendantʼs conduct falling short
of such a standard.
Particular circumstances surrounding the medical conduct in question should be left to
the defendant (doctor or medical institution) to prove as defences. Speciﬁcally, the defend-
ant should be allowed to defend him/herself by arguing that his medical conduct might
have fallen short of the standard of care as described in abstract terms by the plaintiff, but
there were intervening impediments affecting the defendant, such as the arrivals of an
unexpected number of patients, the communication blackout caused by a natural disaster,
the shortage of staff, including doctors, which cannot be made up for through the hospitalʼs
independent efforts, and the inability to modernise the hospital equipment due to the ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties of the local government. These are examples of excuses (“impossibility I”)
as indicated in chart 1.
If this argument is accepted, the defendant would be recognised to have exerted his
utmost endeavour under the circumstances, which means that he is recognised to have fully
performed the purpose of the obligation of means (an obligation to exert oneʼs utmost
endeavour). In other words, factual non-performance exists, but legal non-performance
does not exist. An obligation of result shares the same structure of decision-making in this
respect.
A distinction between an obligation of means and that of result is useful for the deter-
mination of what constitutes performance or factual non-performance. In medical care
cases, deviation from the standard of medical care or the terms of medical care contract
constitutes factual non-performance of an obligation of means while non-attainment of the
guaranteed result constitutes factual non-performance of an obligation of result.
However, this distinction between the two types of obligation does not mean that they
are completely different from each other, in terms of the structure of allegation and proof.
In both types, the defendant may allege and prove an excuse (“impossibility I”).
It seems to the present author that the prevailing theory does not pay much attention
to such speciﬁc circumstances, but falls short of critical thinking, being shackled with its
own dogmatic idea that “because a medical care case involves an obligation of means, the
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defendantʼs imputability and excuse do not matter”.
ⅲ Difference from Tort
In an action founded on tort, the duty of care takes into account any given speciﬁc
circumstance, so that the determination of negligence takes into account any case-speciﬁc
circumstance.
Because of this, in order to prove the defendantʼs negligence (breach of the duty of
care), the plaintiff has to allege and prove all the facts corresponding to the factual non-
performance and the absence of any excuse on the part of the defendant.
However, it is extremely difﬁcult for the plaintiff to allege and prove the speciﬁc
content of the defendantʼs duty of care, while taking into account all of the particular
circumstances surrounding the defendant. To overcome this difﬁculty, where an action is
founded on tort, a technique with which to reduce or shift the plaintiffʼs burden of proof
would be warranted. However, it remains unclear as to whether or not there is any theo-
retical basis, or any extension thereof, of an attempt to reduce or shift the plaintiffʼs bur-
den of proof only in certain classes of cases, such as medical malpractice cases, where
there is a signiﬁcant imbalance of power between the parties with regard to evidence.
In contract, by contrast, the burden of proof can be allocated between the parties
appropriately in accordance with the partiesʼ respective accessibility to evidence.
5. Allocation of the Burden of Proof with regard to Causation
A . De facto Presumption of Causation
In an action sounded in contract, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing
causation, but in reality, the successful proof of non-performance and of some damage
gives rise to the de facto presumption of causation.
e.g. if the non-performance of an obligation to return a leased property and the
speciﬁc amount of rent are proved, it is presumed by experience without any further
proof that damages in the sum equivalent to the rent arise from the non-
performance.
Such presumption is valid in the case of an obligation of means as well. However, if
the defendant successfully proves otherwise, that is, to prove the absence of reasonable
possibility from the beginning to avoid the damage claimed (“impossibility II”), the pre-
sumption is rebutted, and the chain of causation is broken.
31)
For details of the type-II
impossibility, see appendix 3, chart 1.
31) In Downton Abbey, Series 3, during Sybilʼs labour, two doctors have an argument over a diagnosis of
eclampsia. Dr. Clarkson insists on caesarian section, while Sir Philip Tapsell does not see any problem.
Sir Philip prevails and Sybil dies after giving birth to a girl. But after further research, Dr. Clarkson has
discovered, as it appears, that caesarian section would not have saved the mother. This is an example of
impossibility ab initio which is discovered after the event.
R. L. R. A Structure of Doctorʼs Civil Liabilities 29
e.g. due to the failure of an attorney, who serves as a counsel for the defendant, to
ﬁle an appeal by the time limit (non-performance), the judgment in the ﬁrst instance
against the defendant becomes ﬁnal and binding. The defendant is condemned to
pay a judgment debt and thereby incurs loss. The causation between the non-
performance and the loss is presumed, without any further proof, but if the attorney
successfully proves that the appeal court would have supported the judgment in the
ﬁrst instance, namely, the absence ab initio of reasonable possibility to avoid the
loss claimed, the presumption is rebutted.
B . Relationship between Impossibility I and Impossibility II
The type-I impossibility relates to the judgesʼ determination of the cause of non-
performance from a prospective perspective, or more speciﬁcally, a determination as to
whether or not a reasonable person, in the shoes of the defendant at the time of his conduct
in question, could have foreseen and avoided the damage claimed. Materials to be taken
into account in order to make a decision from this perspective should be limited to those
which are accessible to the defendant at the time of the conduct in question, e.g. medical
literature available by the time of the conduct in question. The matter at stake is a possi-
bility so as to avoid the consequence from a prospective perspective, i.e. at the time of the
conduct in question. Was there any reasonable means available with which to avoid the
consequence, for a reasonable person of like background as the defendantʼs, to choose?
The type-II impossibility is impossibility ab initio and relates to the judgesʼ determi-
nation of causation from a retrospective perspective, or more speciﬁcally, a determination
as to whether or not a reasonable person, i.e. a judge at the time of the trial, could avoid
the damage claimed. Materials to be taken into account in order to make a decision from
this perspective include all materials accessible to a judge at the time of his judgment, such
as the latest medical literature produced by the parties. The matter at stake is a possibility
to avoid the consequence from a retrospective perspective, that is, with all the means avail-
able at the time of the trial.
Impossibility of both types I and II are subject to the process of deliberation shown in
appendix 9 which contain a decision-making ﬂowchart on the doctorʼs breach of the duty
of care, with respect to the foreseeability and avoidability of the damage. The judges go
through this process after the doctorʼs factual non-performance of his obligation is estab-
lished by the deliberation process of appendix 8 on the standard of medical care.
The defendant is excused from imputation from factual non-performance by reason of
a type-I impossibility, if ⅰ s/he could not be reasonably expected to have foreseen the risk
(in an abstract sense, fear or apprehension would sufﬁce); ⅱ s/he could have foreseen the
risk and has discharged the duty to foresee it in fact, but could not be reasonably expected
to have avoided the consequence prospectively; or ⅲ s/he has discharged the duty so as to
avoid the consequence.
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If no excuse is granted at this stage, the case moves on to the next stage of making a
determination as to causation.
Since causation is presumed de facto after the proof of factual non-performance and
of some damage, such presumption is rebuttable and the chain of causation may be broken
only where the defendant has successfully proven that s/he cannot be expected to have
avoided the foreseen risk. This is also generally called “an excuse by reason of impossibil-
ity”, but it is to be called impossibility type II, because it is different from impossibility
type I, above.
32)
So far, courts have been applying both the standard of medical care test and the fore-
seeability and avoidability test, and courts have been criticised for the arbitrary and unprin-
cipled manner in which they select and apply one or both of the tests. It is hoped that this
paper makes it clear that the tests are to be applied at different stages in a principled
manner.
C. Proportional Causation Theory based on Bayesʼ Theorem
In medical malpractice cases, illness or injury is normally given, and there is necessa-
rily a concurrence of a number of causes. The but-for test cannot be applied in order to
establish causation where there is a concurrence of a number of causes.
A method currently seen to be the most effective in calculating the proportional con-
tributions of a number of causes to a result, is Bayesʼ theorem. The theorem has been
applied in a wide range of disciplines including information engineering, ﬁnancial engi-
neering, business science, psychology and politics. In the ﬁeld of statistics, the theorem is
even more inﬂuential than the frequency theory of probability.
Where there is a number of concurrent causes, it is not an exaggeration to say that a
proportional causation theory based on Bayesʼ theorem is sine qua non. Otherwise, the
court is bound to effect either under-compensation or over-compensation all of the time.
Kingʼs theory, which has been widely supported among the common law jurisdictions,
also points out that the all-or-nothing rule of causation is unreasonable and proposes an
idea of compensation proportionate to probability.
33)
In connection to this, Principles of the European Contract Law (PECL) 9:504 pro-
32) HASHIMOTO Yoshiyuki, Iryokago Sosho niokeru Wariaiteki Kaiketsu (Proportional Resolution in
Medical Malpractice Litigation) in Sekinin Ho no Tagenteki Kozo (Multidimensional Structure of the
Laws of Liabilities) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku) 2006, considers that the unlawfulness of fault is diminished in
medical malpractice cases involving ⅰ side effects, ⅱ yet-to-be established remedy, and ⅲ yet-to-be
established knowledge, and causation is weakened in cases involving ⅳ adverse prognosis. Perhaps, the
weakening of the unlawfulness might correspond to the type-I impossibility, and that of causation might
correspond to the type-II impossibility.
33) KING, Joseph, Jr. “Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences” (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1353. cf. HIRANO Tetsuro, “Loss-of-Chance
Doctrine in the UK, USA, Canada and Australia and ‘Signiﬁcant Possibilityʼ in Japan (1)” (2011) 44-3
Ryukoku Hogaku 70.
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vides, “The non-performing party is not liable for loss suffered by the aggrieved party to
the extent that the aggrieved party contributed to the non-performance or its effects.” This
provision might be construed to justify a similar proportional causation theory.
Bayesʼ theorem helps calculate the probability that substandard medical care was pro-
vided in a case in which a patient died. If this is calculated, it is no longer necessary to
hold the doctor fully liable for the entire consequence ﬁrst of all, and then to make reduc-
tions in the award of damages by calculating comparative negligence by analogy. It is
possible to hold the defendant liable only to the extent that s/he has contributed to the
consequence, by excluding the contributions made by the given illness or injury, or by the
conduct of the patient or of any third party.




A distinctive feature of Bayesʼ theorem is that it helps to calculate the probability that
a certain event is a cause of the result by calculating the probability of a cause backwardly
from the result, based on the conditional probability that the result emerges from a cause,
which can be discerned by experiment.
Assume, for example, that the probability of the patientʼs death (B) is 70% on condi-
tion that the medical care provided for the patient falls short of the standard of care [Pr
(B/A1)=0.7], and 40% on condition that the medical care provided to the patient is up to
the standard [Pr (B/A2)=0.4].
Subtraction of the latter from the former may seem to suggest that a 30% chance of
the avoidance of the death has been lost due to substandard medical care.
34)
However,
subtraction is not a right method here. Then, to put the relevant probabilities into Bayesʼ
theorem, which returns the probability that substandard medical care has contributed to the
death [Pr (A1/B)] is 0.64, on the basis of the prior probability of 0.5 each for the provision
of substandard medical care, and for that of up-to-standard care (Bayesʼ theorem assumes
that there are equal prior probabilities among unknown factors according to the principle of
insufﬁcient reason). Therefore, the probability that the death is caused by substandard
medical care is 64 percent.
Take a more complicated example:
1．The probability that the patient would have undergone a given examination if the
doctor had explained the need for it, is 80 percent.
2．The probability that the patient would have been found to be suffering from a disease
if s/he had undergone the examination, is 70 percent.
3．The probability that the disease would have been cured if it had been properly treated,
is 50 percent.
34) e.g. Matsuyama v Birnbaum 452 Mass 1; 890 NE 2d 819 (Mass. 2008).
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The result of the multiplication of all these probabilities is 28%, which indicates the
probability that the patient would have recovered if s/he had been provided with up-to-
standard medical care. Now, suppose that the probability of the patientʼs death after sub-
standard medical care is 90% (which means that there is a 10% chance that the patient
would not have died even if no measure had been taken). The contribution of substandard
medical care to the patientʼs death is 0.56, in accordance with Bayesʼ theorem. Therefore,
56% of the entire damage should be compensated by the defendant. As such, Bayesʼ
theorem enables an objective calculation of the proportion of contribution, even where
there are a number of concurrent conditions.
Where the defence of the contribution of other causes (nova causa interveniens) is
advanced, which is almost inevitable in most medical malpractice cases, it is necessary to
apply Bayesʼ theorem to calculate the proportion of contribution by each of the alleged
causes. In most cases, such a partial defence is accepted.
In the process of decision-making on type-II impossibility, the judges are required to
resort to Bayesʼ theorem to calculate proportional causation, because the type-II impossibil-
ity involves the process of calculating the contribution of the alleged non-performance to
the alleged consequence, by taking into account all the relevant conditions ascertainable at
the time of the trial.
D. Easy Mistakes in Judgesʼ Deliberation on Causation
It is an easy mistake, which is all too frequently made, even in common law jurisdic-
tions, to deny causation where there is only a 28% chance of recovery after the provision
of up-to-standard medical care, because the requisite standard of proof, which is more than
50%, is not discharged. By the same token, it is a mistake to allow 100% compensation
where there is only a 56% chance of recovery. The common error is to equate the chance
of recovery with the proportion of contribution of the defendantʼs breach of duty to the
damage in question. The error is caused by confusion between (1) novus actus interve-
niens (“a new intervening act”) which breaks a chain of causation, and (2) contribution of
other factors, nova causa interveniens (“a new intervening cause”), to the damage.
The issue of the standard of proof can be translated as judgesʼ evaluation of evidence
(Beweiswürdigung), i.e., their evaluation of how far the plaintiffʼs allegation is true. He
may be asserting that there was a 20% chance of recovery or a 60% chance. Where judg-
esʼ evaluation of the probative value of the plaintiffʼs evidence is more than 50%, his
assertion is accepted whether it is that there was a 20% chance of recovery or a 60%
chance, and the respective proportion of the sum of compensation as claimed may be
awarded. Where judgesʼ evaluation of the probability of the plaintiffʼs evidence is 50% or
lower, which means that the presumption of causation is rebutted by the defendantʼs evi-
dence, and that the chain of causation is broken, no damages may be awarded, whether the
breachʼs contribution to the damage has been accepted as 50% or as 80 percent.
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Thus, judgesʼ decision-making on causation involves two issues: (1) novus actus inter-
veniens which breaks a chain of causation, and (2) nova causa interveniens, i.e. contribu-
tion of other factors to the damage. The former is an all-or-nothing question, while the
latter is a question of proportion. It seems to the present author to be futile to continue
debating whether causation is all-or-nothing or proportion, because the underlying hypothe-
sis of both of the arguments proves itself to be wrong.
The ﬁrst issue is qualitative, and is to be resolved by the application of the but-for
test, while the second issue is quantitative, and is to be resolved by the application of
Bayesʼ theorem. Where there is no discernible concurrent factor to the damage, the case
can be disposed of by resolving the ﬁrst issue. Where there are concurrent factors to the
damage, as in such a category of cases as medical malpractice cases, the second issue must
be resolved.
6. Standard of Proof
A. High Probability
Prevailing academic opinion and case law require a high degree of probability beyond
reasonable doubt (Supreme Court, Judgment of 24 October 1975, Lumbar Shock Case
35)
).
It is said that probability of more than 80% is the requisite standard in judgesʼ evaluation
of evidence.
36)
In fact, there is no legislative basis for this position.
B. Comparative Probability
It is not necessary to prove a high degree of probability. It is sufﬁcient to show that
allegation is comparatively more probable than not. The acceptable degree ranges from 60
to 70 percent, although this depends on the degree of clariﬁcation.
37)
C. Balance of Probabilities
The standard of proof in civil cases should be “on balance of probabilities” as in the
common law jurisdictions. The requisite threshold is often described in terms of “more
than half” or “more than 51 percent”.
38)
The English courts consider it wrong and mislead-
35) 29-9 Minshu 1417
36) KURATA Takuji, Minji Kotsu Sosho no Kadai (Problems of Civil Road Trafﬁc Accident Litigations to
be Addressed) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha) 1970, p. 191.
37) ITOH Makoto, “Shomei, Shomeido oyobi Shomei Sekinin” (Proof, Standard of Proof and Burden of
Proof) (2001) 254 Hogaku Kyoshitsu 33; “Shomeido wo meguru Shomondai” (Problems concerning the
Standard of Proof) (2002) 1098 Hanrei Times 4.
38) ENDO Naoya, Law School Kyoiku Ron (On Law School Education) (Tokyo: Shinzansha) 2000; TA-
MURA Yoko, “Shomeido no Hoteki Seishitsu” (Legal Character of the Standard of Proof) (2008)
321-322 Ritsumeikan Hogaku 303 and “Minji Sosho ni okeru Shomeido Saiko” (On the Standard of
Proof in Civil Procedure, Further Thought) (2009) 327-328 Ristumeikan Hogaku 517.
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ing to describe the standard of proof in such numerical terms. There is an inevitable
inference from the expression ʻon balanceʼ, which is not apparent in the Japanese transla-
tion, that the court takes into account all the evidence.
D. Discussions
⒤ Practical Problems after 2000
On 22 September 2000, the Supreme Court has recognised the loss of a signiﬁcant
possibility as an object of compensation (see 7A below)
39)
. Since then, a higher degree of
proof tends to be required in order to establish causation, where there are an increasing
number of cases in which the courtʼs attention is diverted to the issue of a signiﬁcant
possibility.
40)
The description of the standard of proof in terms of “high probability” sug-
gests more than 80 percent. Cases where the probability of causation is less than 80%,
tend to pursue the loss of a signiﬁcant possibility.
ⅱ Roots of the Requirement of High Probability
The standard of proof in criminal cases
41)
has been adopted in civil cases by accident.
The standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” may be calculated to be more than 90% in
criminal cases, rather than only 80%, but it is wrong to adopt the same standard of proof
in civil cases. Proof is sufﬁcient if allegation seems to be “more probable than not”. The
common law criminal standard of proof has been introduced after the Second World War,
while the civil procedure remains under the inﬂuence of German law.
ⅲ Court Practice
The present authorʼs years of experience as a judge has led to the consideration that in
practice, judges tend to evaluate evidence of parties on balance of probabilities. If a feath-
er of evidence tips the balance in favour of one party, it tends to precipitate such a sudden
turn of the balance in the mind of a judge, as is sometimes described in terms of “avalan-
che of evidential evaluation”. In his/her judgment, such an avalanche tends to be ex-
pressed in terms of “high probability”. When judges or future judges study abroad, nowa-
days, an overwhelming majority of them visit English-speaking common law countries
rather than German-speaking countries, which academics might prefer. It seems to the
present author that, as a result, many judges support the standard of proof on balance of
probabilities.
ⅳ Reﬂections on the Lumbar Shock Case
The Supreme Court ruling in the Lumbar Shock Case, which has adopted a high
probability beyond reasonable doubt as the civil standard of proof, actually states that the
proof does not need to be that of natural science, and that the reasonable estimation of an
39) The Supreme Court, Judgment of 22 September 2000 (64-7 Minshu 2574).
40) ISHIKAWA Hirotoshi and OHBA Megumi, “Soto Teido no Kanosei no Hyoryu” (Drifting Idea of A
Signiﬁcant Possibility) (2010) 61-3 Ho to Seiji 464.
41) The Supreme Court, Judgment of 5 August 1948 (2-9 Keishu 1123).
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ordinary person is quite sufﬁcient. However, these remarks tend to be ignored. Some
judges on Medical Bench have required the plaintiff to prove medical or etiological or
developmental or generation mechanisms of the health damage in question and have dis-
missed the statistics of a 78% chance of survival, for the reason that the rate falls short of
the standard of high probability.
42)
This ruling has misconstrued the tenets of the Lumbar
Shock ruling.
43)
Judges are conﬂating the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt
with the civil standard of high probability. A civil case is sufﬁcient to be proven on
balance of probabilities in the reasonable estimation of an ordinary person.
44)
7. Damage: Loss of a Signiﬁcant Possibility, Chance or Reasonable
Expectation (Patientʼs Interests to be Protected by Law)
See appendices 4 to 8, charts 2 to 6
A. Loss of Signiﬁcant Possibility
In actions founded on contract, two respective instances of ruling by the Supreme
Court dated 22 September 2000,
45)
and 11 November 2003,
46)
have recognised, as an object
of compensation (cf. head of damages), the loss of an adequate
47)
or signiﬁcant possibility
that death or serious after-effect would not have occurred but for the negligence of the
doctor. Such a possibility can be clearly classiﬁed as a performance interest of the patient
arising under every medical contract.
The concept of such a signiﬁcant possibility can be incorporated into a contract by
construing that the doctor is necessarily (and therefore by an implied term) obliged to
preserve such a signiﬁcant possibility as a performance interest of his patient (it is desira-
ble that this should be expressly stipulated by a statute or as an express contractual term).
This concept seems to be quite original to the Supreme Court of Japan, which has
recognised the duty to compensate the loss of such a signiﬁcant possibility only in cases
involving death or serious after-effects. This concept can be positively evaluated as a kind
of ﬂoodgate, which controls the number of actions passing through the courtʼs doors, such
that the court may concentrate on meritorious actions alleging infringements of a certain
class of very important “legal goods” (ho-eki; Rechtsgüter), or “legally protected inter-
42) Osaka District Court, Judgment of 29 September 2010, [2010] 2116 Hanrei Jiho 97.
43) cf. ITOH Makoto (2010) 1086 Hanrei Times 13 criticises the case along a similar line.
44) YAMAMOTO Kazuhiko (2010) 1086 Hanrei Times 30 has noted, “It seems to me that the standard of
proof is a question of distribution of the risk of losing the case. Parties in civil cases are equals and
their respective positions are interchangeable, and therefore, in my view, the basic standard of proof
should be comparative probability ...”
45) 64-7 Minshu 2574.
46) 57-10 Minshu 1466.
47) The Japanese original here uses the adjective soto, which appears in another context, such as the
concept of adäquate Kausalität (soto ingakankei), which is translated as “adequate causality” in English.
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ests”, because the general recognition of compensation for loss of chance may cause the
court to become ﬂooded with a great number of unmeritorious and frivolous claims.
B. Loss of Chance (Patientʼs Reasonable Expectation)
The Supreme Courtʼs judgment of 25 February, 2011
48)
held that there is a room to
award compensation even merely for an “infringement of expectation”, where the medical
conduct in question was extremely poor. The infringement of expectation in this ruling
should, in substance, be regarded as a loss of chance
49)
.
In fact, this 2011 ruling of the Supreme Court of Japan was founded on tort. The
“medical conduct in question was extremely poor”, in other words, falling far short of the
standard of care. This may be construed in contract to mean falling far short of contractual
expectation, which constitutes a failure in the performance of an important obligation, in
other words, loss of important performance interest of the patient, which may not be tangi-
ble enough to be calculated in economic terms, but which the law of contract must protect.
The loss of, or interference with, signiﬁcant possibility/chance, the right to self-
determination, the dignity or quality of life, etc., are protecting some intangible interests,
quite independently of health. These interests are to be collectively called “interests of
reasonable expectation of the patient”.
There are interests which may be protected by law even where their infringements do
not necessarily entail any tangible damage, for example, the legally protected interests
under the old common law trespass to the person, namely, a range of voluntary interfer-
ence with the freedom of movement, physical security and integrity of another person,
which is actionable per se, in other words, without proof of any actual damage. So, if a
doctor, knowing that a patient is a Jehovahʼs-witness, who has refused to give consent to
any blood transfusion for religious reasons, nevertheless goes on to give the patient a blood
transfusion, the doctor is guilty of trespass, and condemned to pay damages, even in such a
case where the blood transfusion saves the patientʼs life. The damages are likely to be
nominal in such cases.
In contract, the patientʼs performance interest, that is the obligation as owed by the
doctor to the patient, which the law of contract must protect, can, and ought to be, much
wider than the security and integrity of the patientʼs body, for example, reasonable expect-
ation
50)
of respect for the patientʼs autonomy, dignity or quality of life, and signiﬁcant
possibility or chance of recovery, so long as such reasonably exists.
48) [2011] 1344 Hanrei Times 110.
49) HIRANO (2011) 145-2 Minshoho Zasshi 249, HIRANO (2011) 44-3 Ryukoku Hogaku 313.
50) In English law, damages can be awarded for the loss of expectation as a performance interest of a
contract. Ruxley v Forsyth [1996] AC 344; CARTWRIGHT, John, Contract Law: An Introduction to
English Law of Contract for Civil Lawyer, 2d ed. (Oxford: Hart Publications) 2007, pp. 263-264.
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8. Conclusions
Ohmura argues that the purpose of the enhancement of the applicability of the law of
contracts, which the proposed amendment of the Civil Code is designed to promote, is the
development of a “society based on contract”.
51)
A society based on contract is a society
which employs a contract as a tool with which to regulate the relationship between parties,
in other words, a society which employs the contract as a tool with which to improve its
structures. In such a contract-based society, contract is not merely a tool of transferring
property, but also an essential tool with which to draw people into relationship. In the
context of the type of contract for the provision of medical service, contract is a tool with
which to connect patients and medical service providers, and to regulate their relationships.
Among medical service providers, there are some who see the introduction of the concept
of contract - as well as medical litigation - into the medical community, as lawʼs interfer-
ences with their autonomy and integrity. However, medical care contract contributes to the
clariﬁcation of obligations (rights and duties) of the medical service providers and patients
as well as towards the betterment of medicine.
Doctors tend to ﬁnd the law embarrassing, offensive and frightening, largely because
there is uncertainty about what is going on in the legal process, which appears to come to
a conclusion, so far, in a black box. Those ﬂowcharts of the courtʼs process of decision-
making on liabilities, which are attached to this report as appendices, are intended to help
disperse such uncertainty of law for doctors, and to help doctors understand in advance in
what circumstances the court imposes legal liabilities on them. It is hoped that these repre-
sent models of decision-making process which help make crystal clear the rules by means
of which the court determines civil liabilities of doctors; bridges the gaps between medi-
cine and law, between doctors and patients; and enhances their mutual understanding and
co-operation.
51) OHMURA Atsushi, Minpo Kaisei wo kangaeru (On the Revision of the Civil Code) (Tokyo: Iwanami)
2011, pp. 160-179. cf. MAINE, Henry J. C., Ancient Law (London: John Murray) 1861, Chapter V.
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Appendix 2.
Adapted from the charts of Tatsuaki MAEDA “Kōjutsu Saiken sōron” 3
rd
ed. (1993) 226-227
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Appendix 3.
Chart 1
Fatal and Serious Cases, Level 1



































Impossibility I＝(i) the doctor
could not have foreseen the
risk (absence of prospective
possibility to foresee), (ii) the
doctor could have foreseen the
risk and actually performed the
obligation to foresee it, but
could not have avoided the
consequence prospectively (ab-
sence of prospective possibility
to avoid); or (iii) the doctor

















Break in the chain of
causation
Contribution of other
causes (e.g. acts of the
patient or third parties,


























KAD＝keep abreast with developments in medical science and technology
PS＝presumption
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Appendix 4.
Chart 2
Fatal and Serious cases, Level 2





























Existence of possibility to avoid the
loss of a significant possibility (effect)
↓
III. Damage Over 50% Existence of a significant possibility
that the patientʼs death or serious after-
effects would not have occurred at the
time of the accident
PF＝performance
Same as Chart 1
Same as Chart 1
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Appendix 5.
Chart 3
Fatal and Serious Cases, Level 3




































































III. Damage Over 50% Infringement of the patientʼs reason-
able expectation interest
(e. g. loss of chance to receive
proper and timely medical care,







Same as Chart 1
Same as Chart 2
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Appendix 6.
Chart 4
Non-Fatal/Serious Cases, Level 1
Occurrence of some (physical or mental) health damage other than fatality or serious after-effect
or mental distress where there is apparent causation between non-PF and the damage
Chart 4 is identical with Chart 1, except that the damage in question is not the patientʼs death or serious
after-effects (which means e.g. that funeral expenses and bereavement do not necessarily arise).
Appendix 7.
Chart 5
Non-Fatal/Serious Cases, Level 2






















































Same as Chart 1＝Chart 4
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Appendix 8.
Chart 6
No Health Damage Cases
In such cases, infringement of the patientʼs interest, such as “chance to receive proper and timely
medical care,” “right to self-determination,” and “dignity or quality of life,” becomes an issue, instead
of health damage.
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Appendix 9.
Flowcharts of the process of decision-making on the doctorʼs breach of the duty of care
1. The Standard of Medical Care Approach
These charts show the process of making determination as to factual non-performance (within the
bold square in Chart 1), so as to determine whether or not the medical conduct of the defendant
doctor or medical institution has satisfied the standard of medical care.
Matters within bold squares below must be alleged and proven by the plaintiff.
NO
The case satisfies the 
requirements under the 
judgment of the Supreme 
The institution has not 
breached any duty of self-
education, explanation, 
provision of remedy or 
transfer of patient
NO
The relevant knowledge is deemed to be the standard of 
medical care with which the medical institution should 
comply.
Requirement (ii): Can the medical institution be 
reasonably expected to have the relevant knowledge ?
YES
Requirement (i): Is the knowledge of the remedy 
shared to a considerable degree among medical 
institutions which are similar to the medical institution in 
question (in terms of the status of the institution, the 
medical care environment where the institution is located, 
etc.) ?
YES




The relevant knowledge is 
not deemed to be the 
standard of medical care
with which the medical 
institution should comply.
NO
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＊1 : It may become an issue whether or not the terms and wording of explanation and the manner and circum-
stances in which it was given, have satisfied the standard of medical care.
＊2 : However, the doctor or medical institution is rarely held responsible for a breach of the duty of explanation
even where they have failed to explain or have given an inadequate explanation, as long as they have actually
provided up-to-the-standard medical care.
Breach of the duty to provide
Has the doctor or medical institution failed to provide
relevant remedy?
Has the doctor or medical institution got necessary skills
and means with which to provide the relevant remedy ?
Has the doctor or medical institution failed to explain the 
relevant risks and benefits of the remedy to the patient ?*1
Has the doctor or medical 
institution failed to transfer 
the patient to another 
medical institution that is 
capable of providing 
the remedy ?
Breach of the duty of
explanation*2




Has the doctor in private practice failed to, or has the 
medical institution failed to have its doctors, keep 
abreast with the relevant developments in medical science
and technology ?
Breach of the duty of
self-education
Court, November 27, 2001 
(the failure to give 
explanation constitutes 
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Appendix 10.
Flowcharts of the process of decision-making on the doctorʼs breach of the duty of care
2. Foreseeability and Avoidability of the Consequence Approach
The charts below show the process of making determination as to Impossibilty. Matters within bold
squares below must be alleged and proven by the defendant as a defense against the allegation of
non-performance.
The matter in the shaded square must be proven by the defendant in order to reverse the presumption
of causation.
＊ In this case, the doctor has failed to discharge the obligation to foresee but the chain of causation between the
failure and the consequence is broken, so that the doctor is, in principle, excused from liability for the conse-
quence. However, if the deviation from the standard of medical care or from the terms of medical care contract




proof of the 
impossibility 




(ii) Failure to 
prove the 
impossibility 
I = Liable for 
non-performance
de jure




(iii) Failure to 
prove the 
impossibility 
II = Causation 
presumed
(iv) Successful proof of
the impossibility II 
(there is a breach of the 
duty of foresight but the 
chain of causation is 
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Appendix 11.
Marginal Cost Curve for the Determination of the Doctorʼs Breach
of the Duty of Care
KAGAYAMA Shigeru “Koi mataha Kashitsu, Ingakankei niokeru Teiryobunseki no Hitsuyo”
(The Necessity of Quantitative Analysis in the Determination of Dolus, Culpa and Causation)
(2011) 15 Meijigakuin Law Review 26
The value of x at a point where the social cost curve (the sum of marginal cost of care and marginal
expected damage) is minimum, that is, where the inclination of the social cost curve is zero (horizontal),
is determined as the threshold quantity of the duty of care i.e. the standard of medical care. Where
such a threshold quantity of the duty of care is increased or decreased to a certain point under the terms
of a medical care contract, the quantity at that point shall be the threshod quantity of the duty of care
under the contract. If the actual medical conduct in question falls within the area on the left of the
vertical line going through the minimal point of the social cost curve, i.e. the line of the threshold
quantity of reasonable care at x*, that conduct constitutes “factual non-performance.”
Hand Formula: a doctor is in negligence where the cost of care is smaller than the expected damage.
Quantitative analysis of law: a doctor is in negligence where the marginal cost is smaller the marginal
expected damage.
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